Stickiness in economics is normal human behavior, is hard to reduce, and is highly destructive. For example, stickiness changed just another avoidable contraction [14] into the sustained Great Depression [15].

Stickiness is characteristic of how producers choose asking prices [16], how government-supervised producers choose the wages to offer [15], and in general how governments take action [17].

The first step in dealing with stickiness is to admit we have a problem.

Regardless of which element types a modeler uses for various elements, the modeler must validate that the resulting model approaches reality closely enough to be useful. For models that are large in scale or that include complex elements or dependencies, validation would demand copious information [18].

For individual buyers, producers, and coercers, the underlying lifetimes of preparation, the balance sheets, and other factors are not measured, reported, and learned.

A modeler could restrict consideration to, say, the aggregated buyers in a nation and the aggregated producers in each sector. At such levels of aggregation, much information is reported.

A modeler conceivably might correlate the rates of product innovation in different sectors by starting from the general observation that the most innovation that makes its way into practical products for sale is the innovation that’s done in the sectors that are the least regulated [19]. The modeler might quantify the many forms that regulation takes and their many impacts, and correlate these negative inputs to the changes in various sectors’ relative outputs. But such modeling hasn’t been done.

The result is that despite its large scale, current economic modeling takes the product mix as frozen into place across all time [20]. There is no modeling of the innovation, the increasing specialization, and the full frictional drags from governments that most-fundamentally determine how the economic value-added changes over time.

So then at present, at most a modeler might, for instance, try to correlate how aggregate transactions might change by sector if a pandemic would spread, or if a government would increase its debt-financed spending.

Even for such limited questions, what modeling has been done has not been adequate. The most-developed correlations have ignored debt [21] and have ignored most actions of governments.

Of course individuals—whose aggregate behavior, after all, is what is being modeled—obviously do pay particularly-close attention to debt, and to all kinds of actions of governments that affect them.